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Decision making: The two stages of neuronal judgement
B.A.J. Reddi
A recent study of how a monkey’s frontal cortex
responds when decisions are made more difficult has
characterised the two distinct stages which turn sensory
evidence into a command for action.
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The recent flurry of studies on aspects of the neural
decision-making process has been exhilarating, but how
do the various observations fit together? A powerful argu-
ment is beginning to emerge that seems to make sense of
this medley of experimental and theoretical data: deci-
sions are not unitary events, but arise from two distinct
sequential processes.
Imagine looking through long grass at a moving animal. If it
is a tiger we might respond by running; but perhaps it is just
a cat? We need to decide quickly whether the tiger hypoth-
esis is correct. The first step is to register the fragments of
information available — a glimpse of orange, a heavy foot-
step, a flashing tooth… The next step is to assemble these
fragments of evidence — some for, some against — to eval-
uate the truth of the hypothesis. This second stage also
includes our prior expectation — is a cat not more likely
than a tiger? — and the implications of being wrong —
clearly running from a cat is far less catastrophic than
stroking a tiger.
Or consider the most common decision we make — we do it
two or three times a second throughout our waking lives —
what to look at next. The first stage in deciding to make this
movement — a saccade — is to establish the existence and
location of components of the visual scene. Next, we need to
decide to which part of the visual scene it is most important
to shift our gaze. This is an ideal decision to study, being
simple, unselfconscious and easy to manipulate. Indeed,
studying saccades has taught us much about these two stages
of decision making and their representation in the brain.
Stage 1: registration
Neurons in the frontal eye fields (FEFs) respond to the
appearance of those stimuli that are potential targets for
saccades; their maintained activity level shows selectivity
for colour and shape, but only responds to fragments of the
visual scene available to their receptive field [1]. In a dis-
tractor task, where for instance the subject must shift gaze
to a green target amongst red distractors, the initial
response is the same whether the stimulus is red or green.
Over time however, as sensory evidence accumulates, the
response to red stimuli falls and the late phase of activity
reliably distinguishes red from green (Figure 1). The time
taken for the activities to diverge significantly (Td) is
increased when target and distractor are similar [2] —
indeed we can imagine that it takes longer to distinguish a
fragment of tiger from cat if the cat is ginger.
Several strands of evidence suggest that this stage of
stimulus registration is distinct from a subsequent stage
that interprets the evidence and determines a response.
First, Td, the relatively consistent time for a visual neuron
in the FEF to make its discrimination, does not reliably
predict the overall response time, which is characteristi-
cally far more variable [3]. Furthermore, FEF neurons
show target discrimination activity even when no subse-
quent response is made [4]. 
Figure 1
The upper traces compare the activity derived from a visually
responsive FEF neuron when a target (black line) or a distractor (red
line) appears in the receptive field. Although initially the response is the
same to both, after a certain period the response to the distractor falls
whilst the response to the target is maintained. (Adapted from [3].) The
lower trace demonstrates the constant rate of rise of activity from a
movement selective cell (blue line) following divergence of the
response to target and distractor in the visually selective cell. Here, the
activity is derived from the firing of the neuron from a selection of trials
of median latency. In practice, the rate of rise varies randomly between
trials; the saccade is only initiated after the activity reaches a constant
threshold level. (Adapted from [10].)
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A recent study in Jeff Schall’s lab has addressed this ques-
tion particularly directly. Sato et al. [5] suggest that Td
marks the conclusion of perceptual processing: thus, whilst
making discrimination more difficult will increase Td,
making the subsequent response more difficult will not.
Figure 2 shows this is indeed what happens: and the
increase in reaction time produced by making the targets
harder to discriminate can be entirely attributed to an
increase in Td. Therefore, by the end of stage one we have
an array of units responding selectively to various features
of the scene — colour, shape, motion — but we have yet to
integrate this information in order to identify the stimulus
and justify a response. Like court witnesses, these units
have given their version of events as they see them but will
have no role in interpreting the crime or passing sentence.
Is the second stage the judge, who brings together the evi-
dence, identifies the guilty party and administers justice? 
Stage 2: interpretation
Much of our knowledge of this second stage of the
decision process comes from behavioural, rather than elec-
trophysiological, experiments. When we measure saccadic
reaction times there are two striking features: they are
both unexpectedly long and surprisingly variable. Further
analysis of this variability led Roger Carpenter [6] to
develop a simple model, referred to as LATER for ‘linear
approach to threshold with ergodic rate’, which econom-
ically describes the second stage in our decision process
both for saccades and other movements.
The LATER model postulates the existence of competing
decision signals that represent alternative hypotheses
about the nature and location of a stimulus. Fuelled by
incoming sensory evidence, the decision signal rises at a
constant rate. The signals race to reach a threshold level of
confidence, at which the winning hypothesis is accepted
and the appropriate response generated. In order to add
the biological advantage of unpredictability to the response,
the rate of signal rise varies randomly about a mean value
that reflects the rate of arrival of information about the
stimulus. For example, if there are more gaps in the grass,
letting through more visual information, we will build up
evidence for or against the tiger hypothesis more rapidly.
In terms of neural processes, this would translate into a
larger number of first-stage witness neurons feeding into a
second-stage judgement neuron whose activity thus
changes more quickly.
Clearly, factors other than information affect the reaction
time. Prior probability is one of them: judges take into
account previous convictions when making their decision.
In the LATER model, the prior probability corresponds to
the starting level from which the decision signal rises, so
that a hypothesis about an expected stimulus is accepted
more quickly: if we are roaming Bengal, then we will
accept the tiger hypothesis more quickly than if we are in
Paris. Another factor is the confidence we require in our
hypothesis: we accept a hypothesis more rapidly if the
implications of being wrong are less catastrophic than the
Figure 2
(a) Activity in visually responsive neurons of the FEF following
appearance of an eight stimulus array. Both colour search and motion
search were investigated. In colour search, the discrimination was
made harder by making the colours more similar. In motion search,
each stimulus was a circular aperture of randomly positioned dots
which translated coherently in a specified direction (target opposite
direction from distractors); targets were made harder to discriminate by
reducing the number of coherently moving dots. The time taken for the
target (black line) and distractor (red line) responses to deviate
significantly (Td) is greater when the stimuli are harder to discriminate
(bottom). (b) The change in Td accounts for the increase in reaction
time under this condition, suggesting that Td reflects the completion of
visual discrimination. (c) Activity in visually responsive FEF neurons
following the presentation of eight coloured stimuli. A display
supporting the most simple colour search was used, and under the
easy condition the monkey made a saccade to the green target,
ignoring the red distractors. Under the difficult condition, the target and
a distractor unexpectedly swapped positions during some of the trials
and the monkey had to abandon the first saccade and plan another one
to the new target position in order to earn a reward. Although these
‘step’ trials were not included in the analysis, the overall response time
for saccades under this condition were increased as the monkeys
planned their responses more cautiously. (d) Td is the same under both
conditions, suggesting that it reflects a perceptual stage preceding
response planning.
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implications of being too slow, the urgency versus accuracy
profile of a decision is represented in LATER by the
threshold confidence level. Recent experiments designed
to challenge the model have shown that manipulating
parameters of the decision process — the information in a
random dot display (unpublished data obtained in Carpen-
ter’s lab), the prior probability that a target stimulus will
appear at one location [7], or the balance of urgency versus
accuracy [8] — generates the specific changes in reaction
time distribution that are predicted by the LATER model.
We can also record from movement-selective neurons in
the FEF, which appear to embody the second stage of the
decision-making process and show similar behaviour to the
LATER decision signal. These cells, activated after the
visually responsive cells of stage one, reliably predict the
generation of a response; indeed the time course of their
activity predicts the overall reaction time (Figure 1). This
activity rises at a constant rate, subject to random variation,
and a response is initiated when a certain threshold level is
reached that is constant between trials [9]. 
An important contrast between the first and second stages
is in the way they deal with negative evidence. Although
visually responsive cells of the first stage accumulate local
information, second-stage neurons must compare evidence
for and against their hypothesis gathered from across the
visual field. For example, if nearly all positive evidence
about a stimulus points to a ginger cat, but one negative
fact — a dinner-plate-sized paw — points against, we would
be somewhat foolish to consider the positive evidence
alone whilst ignoring the negative. The all-pervasive mech-
anism of lateral inhibition may provide a means for voting
for and against [10,11]. 
Overall, the marriage of behavioural and electrophysio-
logical investigation seems to characterise a second-stage
process that might integrate and contrast information from
stage one to reach a likely interpretation of the stimulus
and elicit the appropriate response.
Linking the stages
The question remains as to how the first stage drives activ-
ity in the second. The maintained activity in stage one,
and the rising activity in stage two, suggest that stage two
might simply integrate the signal from stage one. More
specifically, as the responses in stage one neurons to targets
and distractors begin to diverge, the maintained signals are
contrasted by the second stage — evidence against the
hypothesis being subtracted from the evidence for. This
difference is then integrated, the accumulation of activity
in the second stage thus determining the strength of the
evidence for one hypothesis over another (Figure 3). This
explains why the rise in stage two does not begin until the
start of the divergence in stage one (Figure 1).
If stage two does indeed integrate the differences in this
way, then we would expect that reducing the rate of accu-
mulation of activity in stage one would lead to a delay in
the take off of the signal in stage two. Preliminary results
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Figure 3
Highly schematic representation of the two
steps from stimulus to saccadic decision. The
visual scene consists of an array of randomly
moving dots and the subject is instructed to
make a saccade in the net direction of
movement. Direction-selective stage one
neurons respond to dots in their receptive field.
In order to assess the overall direction of
movement information from stage one, neurons
across the visual field must be integrated by
stage two neurons gathering evidence for and
against their hypothesis, in this case that,
overall, the movement is downward. Stage one
neurons providing positive evidence activate
stage two, whilst those with contradictory
evidence (dashed lines) inhibit. Stage two
activity reflects accumulating balance of
positive minus negative evidence. When the
activity reaches a threshold level an
appropriate saccade is initiated.
Random
dot display 
Stage two
neurons
Current Biology   
Stage one
neurons
Saccade
from the labs of both Schall and Carpenter suggest that
this is the case (J.D. Schall and R.H.S. Carpenter, personal
communications).
Clearly, behavioural and electrophysiological investigations
complement each other, bringing us some way to under-
standing at least simple decision making. However, there
is a subtle theoretical issue in delineating the role of the
second stage of the process — is it interpreting the stimu-
lus or selecting the response? Carpenter holds that stage
two is the point of interpretation, where flashes of orange
become a tiger or the judge identifies the crime. Schall
suggests that stage two is response selection, running from
the tiger or passing a sentence. Carpenter assumes that
interpreting is deciding to act, that conviction of a crime
leads automatically to a sentence, whilst Schall’s view sug-
gests that perhaps incontrovertible evidence of guilt is suf-
ficient for sentencing without formal conviction. 
In the case of saccades, the response is ready to go as soon
as the brainstem oculomotor centres are released from their
inhibition; as essentially no planning is involved, Carpenter’s
assumption might well hold. But complex tasks do require
planning and take longer: might we therefore envisage a
third stage? Perhaps interpretation is followed by selection
of one of several alternative responses that are being
planned concurrently elsewhere. The approach of Sato et al.
[5] to investigating a decision allows the direct measurement
of the duration of component processes and factors influenc-
ing them. Such techniques may enable us to forge ahead
with the study of decisions of greater complexity. 
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